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In everyday usage, the term reconciliation references a process of restoring amicable
relations or facilitating a shared understanding among otherwise conflicted parties. Since
the early 1990s, however, this term has been increasingly used to encapsulate efforts to
promote social and individual repair in the aftermath of war and related mass atrocities,
including war crimes, crimes against humanity, and genocide—all of which are prohibited
in international law. As such, reconciliation is often closely associated with international
criminal law and a range of transitional justice and peace-building mechanisms, including
trials, truth commissions, and commemorative sites and events, that aim to restore a sense
of shared community, promote renewed trust and interdependence among civilians and
parties to the conflict, enable social justice and civil rights, and ensure long-term political
stability (Pham, Weinstein, and Longman 2004). It is likewise often pursued in tandem
with community-based initiatives that seek to take universalized norms and practices
related to reconciliation and render them more culturally and politically appropriate for
a particular post-conflict setting, often by promoting locally conceived alternatives to
international justice and commemoration.
To this end, scholars and practitioners who study reconciliation in various settings have
emerged from the disciplines of international criminal law, anthropology, history, politics,
social work, the forensic sciences, and beyond, and many of the resulting studies are
thoroughly interdisciplinary and cross-cultural in scope. For example, in the context of the
period following the civil war (1986–2006) in northern Uganda, much of the international
work aimed at promoting reconciliation involved practitioners of anthropology, history,
political science, and transitional justice working alongside Ugandan community-based
organizations to privilege indigenous Acholi dispute-resolution rituals, such as mato oput
(drinking the bitter root) and nyouo tong gweno (stepping on the egg), while simultaneously
recognizing the importance of international justice and official recognition. In doing so, they
have enabled a more nuanced understanding of the culturally specific ways that people are
being negatively affected by their experiences of the war. They have likewise helped promote
locally conceived reconciliation initiatives that stand a better chance of facilitating genuine
social repair by spiritually cleansing individuals of the harms they experienced and the bad
deeds they perpetrated, where parties to the conflict are willing (see, e.g., Anyeko et al. 2012;
Baines 2010; Mpyangu 2014).
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This chapter draws on analyses of reconciliation in the aftermath of war and related mass
atrocities in a range of settings and as comprehended through different disciplinary lenses to
provide a comprehensive overview of the way that reconciliatory initiatives often intersect
with local and international gender norms in important ways. It takes as its starting point the
understanding that because war and related mass atrocities often take shape in ways that
reflect contemporary gender norms, reconciliation efforts benefit from applying a similarly
gendered lens. However, to demonstrate the kinds of initiatives and processes that might
promote a gendered approach to reconciliation, as well as the particular challenges that can
entangle and impede such efforts, particular attention is paid in the latter part of the chapter
to reconciliation in Rwanda following the 1994 genocide. Postgenocide Rwanda is in some
ways a fairly exceptional case study in that following the murder of an estimated 400,000 to
800,000 civilians—most of whom were members of the nation’s ethnic Tutsi minority
population—by extremists affiliated with the nation’s ethnic Hutumajority, the violence was
largely recognized in international law as genocide, alongside accompanying crimes against
humanity and war crimes. As the nation was inundated with domestic and international
initiatives aimed at facilitating reconciliation, Rwanda likewise proved fairly exceptional in
that a cohort of women genocide survivors experienced a high degree of success advocating
for meaningful policy changes aimed at promoting gender equality across Rwandan society.
Rwanda is less exceptional, however, in terms of the subsequent challenges and limitations
the nation encountered. In Rwanda, as in many post-conflict nations, efforts to promote
reconciliation were complicated by the politicization of the conflict—most notably, official
recognition of only Tutsi victims and survivors while condemning the Hutu majority as
ge´nocidaires (perpetrators of genocide), as well as the subsequent selective application of
international and domestic justice—amid rapidly changing Rwandan gender norms.
A HISTORY OF RECONCILIATION
Erik Doxtader (2003, 270) identifies the origins of the term reconciliation in Greece around
400 BCE, at which point it connoted ‘‘a change from enmity to/for friendship’’ resulting
from ‘‘the transformation of historical attitudes that promoted violence and/or the alteration
of social-political structures that fostered conflict.’’ From this point, reconciliation became
an increasingly important concept within European popular culture—particularly with its
discussion in the New Testament as part of Paul’s Second Epistle to the Corinthians. As a
result of colonization and the global spread of Christianity that accompanied it, people
around the world were gradually introduced to Christian ideas of reconciliation and accom-
panying values. And as conflict increased in the twentieth century, reconciliation emerged as
a key, though often vaguely defined, concept in efforts to formally recognize the various
harms inflicted on civilians, to promote social repair among the parties to a conflict, and to
prevent the future resurgence of conflicts, most notably in the contexts of the truth and
reconciliation commissions established in postjunta Argentina (1984) and postapartheid
South Africa (1996–1998).
This shift toward a more formal and practical application of reconciliation emerged
from the understanding that in the aftermath of war and related mass atrocities, it is
important to restore good relationships and promote forgiveness among parties to a
conflict—from state-level actors to individual civilians—to minimize the potential for
further bloodshed along related lines (Pankhurst 2008). Social psychologist Malvern Lums-
den was one of the earliest scholars to promote this view, highlighting the necessity of
reconciling ‘‘the outer, social world’’ with the ‘‘inner, psychological world’’ (1997, 377) to
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more effectively overcome the underlying traumas that enable cycles of violence to under-
mine the long-term social vitality of post-conflict communities. This approach has become
so widespread that many post-conflict regimes have chosen to adopt the ‘‘therapeutic
grammar of trauma, hidden suffering, repression, denial, closure, truth revelation, and
catharsis’’ as part of broader efforts to lay national traumas to rest (Moon 2009, 85). Indeed,
international relations expert Claire Moon argues that the successful performance of recon-
ciliation and the post-conflict state’s perceived ability to ‘‘cure people of the pathologies that,
on this account, are a potential cause of the resurgence of future violence’’ are often essential
for demonstrating the legitimacy of post-conflict regimes in the eyes of the international
community (2009, 86). To this end, the successful performance of reconciliation and healing
often draws on the gender norms that exist in a particular post-conflict setting, impacting
men and women in vastly differently ways, as will be discussed in greater detail below.
Where reconciliation initiatives are overseen by the international community, most
notably the United Nations, the resulting interventions often take shape along particular
lines, such as peacekeeping operations to prevent the resurgence of violence; trials, tribunals,
or truth and reconciliation commissions (or a combination of these) aimed at holding
perpetrators responsible for their crimes and at facilitating the creation of a rigorous historical
record; commemorative sites and events intended to promote victim recognition and
dialogue related to the conflict and its causes; and a range of peace-building interventions
to ensure civilians’ security in those areas affected by the conflict, restore key government
functions, encourage inclusivity and democratic reforms within political processes, provide
basic provisions and services to the civilian population, and encourage the revitalization of
the local economy (Boutros-Ghali 2009).
However, international practitioners such as Egyptian diplomat Boutros Boutros-Ghali
have come to recognize that in order to be effective and meaningful for conflicted commun-
ities, reconciliation initiatives ‘‘must be coherent and tailored to specific needs of the country
concerned, based on national ownership, and should comprise a carefully prioritized,
sequenced, and therefore relatively narrow set of activities aimed at achieving the above
objectives’’ (United Nations Peacebuilding Fund). To this end, scholarship has emerged
from different post-conflict settings that emphasizes the need to privilege locally conceived
approaches to reconciliation alongside those mechanisms approved by the international
community. For example, a 2010 volume titled Localizing Transitional Justice, edited by
anthropologist Rosalind Shaw and international human rights law expert Lars Waldorf,
included case studies from Sierra Leone, Guatemala, Israel-Palestine, and South Africa,
among others, that demonstrated the necessity of interrogating the implicit cultural biases
and assumptions inherent in much international transitional justice work, of which recon-
ciliation initiatives are often an integral part. Shaw and Waldorf argued that many transi-
tional justice initiatives were proving ineffective as the universal norms and best practices
adhered to by the international community were ‘‘increasingly destabilized by its local
applications’’ (2010, 4). This is particularly true of those reconciliation initiatives that
were founded on the belief that truth telling facilitates healing—an idea that Shaw had
earlier argued was ‘‘the product of a culture of memory that arose from specific historical
processes in North America and Europe, originating, perhaps, in the redemptive significance
of confession in the church’’ (2005, 7) and thus may not be globally applicable. Adding to
this, international human rights law expert Fionnuala Nı´ Aola´in (2009) provides a reminder
of the necessity of analyzing and deconstructing international masculinities that can be
imported to conflicted or transitional communities as part of the international norms that
surround many transitional justice programs.
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Following up on such insights, many experts on reconciliation now stress the need to
draw on partnerships with local actors and organizations that can offer a more coherent
understanding of the particular cultural, historical, political, and social factors that led to the
emergence of conflict in their communities. While not without the potential to introduce
further complications, this collaborative and locally informed approach is frequently
regarded as necessary for establishing more appropriate, effective, and meaningful paths
toward reconciliation. Indeed, there is widespread recognition among scholars and practi-
tioners that the intersections between the international community’s prioritizing of ‘‘liberal
normative goods, such as the rule of law, peace, reconciliation, civil society, human rights,
combating impunity, and justice,’’ and the on-the-ground realities surrounding ‘‘local
justice’’ are inherently messy (Hinton 2010, 1). Anthropologist Kristin C. Doughty has
argued that, contrary to the romanticized notion that there is in some post-conflict contexts
space ‘‘where a kinder, gentler reconciliation can occur, absent power relations of age, gender,
class, or other forms of silencing. . . . the work of building and rebuilding social networks
among ‘intimate enemies’ . . . is contentious, suffused with hostility and instrumentality’’
(2015, 432). This is because any locally conceived approach to reconciliation must involve an
inclusive reckoning with the past—with its inevitable real and perceived injustices and
privileges—that takes into consideration the post-conflict perspectives and needs of all
parties to the conflict. Consequently, Doughty calls on transitional justice practitioners to
attend to the various forms of social identity that inform transitional justice and reconcilia-
tion initiatives with the understanding that processes aimed at facilitating social repair are
inherently violent, in so far as they frequently involve negotiating uncomfortable truths and
conflicting values in ways that can facilitate further suffering within communities prior to
enabling reconciliation.
INTERSECTIONS BETWEEN RECONCILIATION AND GENDER
Gender is but one important form of social identity that influences the experiences of
reconciliation in post-conflict communities. For this reason, scholars and practitioners of
reconciliation frequently highlight the importance of local gender norms and dynamics for
developing culturally appropriate strategies to promote reconciliation. This tendency
emerges from the realization that war and related mass atrocities often affect people in
dramatically different ways as a result of their real or perceived sex or gender, among other
identifying factors. Broadly speaking, in many contexts, state military and paramilitary
institutions call primarily on men to serve as combatants, and many of these men may feel
it necessary to respond positively to this call to arms to prove themselves both as men—by
protecting their homes and families, for example—and as loyal members of their commun-
ities, although other factors, such as fear, revenge, and opportunism, might also motivate
their decision to join the military. As the conflict escalates, men often serve primarily on the
front lines of the conflict, witnessing firsthand the brutality of war and suffering the physical
and psychological consequences of combat and any related mass atrocities that may occur,
whether perpetrated by or against them. In this light, Adam Jones (2004, 2000) has high-
lighted the tendency for men of battle age to be the main victims of war and related mass
atrocities—at least in terms of the number of dead—as a result of their status as (potential)
combatants and their associated proximity to the front lines of the conflict.
This pattern was clearly evident during the Bosnian War (1992–1995), during which
men from the Bosnian Serb, BosnianMuslim (Bosniak), and Bosnian Croat ethnonationalist
communities were called on by their respective political elites to protect their communities
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by fighting those who they believed threatened their well-being. As a result, many able-
bodied Bosnian men served on the various front lines of the war with either the national
Bosnian army or the opposing Bosnian Serb and Bosnian Croat paramilitary groups,
rendering them vulnerable to a range of conflict-related physical and psychological harms.
Their potential to serve as combatants further rendered those men who refused to fight or
were forced to lay down their weapons vulnerable to genocide, war crimes, and crimes against
humanity, most notably at Srebrenica in July 1995. Following months of siege by Bosnian
Serb militias, commander Ratko Mladic´ invaded the former United Nations safe area that
had been providing refuge to approximately 40,000 Bosniak civilians from around the
Republika Srpska, a Bosnian Serb–controlled political entity founded in 1992. After permit-
ting the evacuation of the Bosniak women and children, Mladic´ commanded the execution
of the remaining 8,000 Bosniak civilian men. This massacre represents the only legally
recognized instance of genocide that occurred during the three-year Bosnian War, although
scholars such as political scientist Edina Bec´irevic´ (2010; see also Leydesdorff 2011; Simic´
and Daly 2011) have argued that genocide was perpetrated by Bosnian Serb militias against
Bosniak civilians throughout Republika Srpska, if not Bosnia as a whole.
As a conflict draws to a close, surviving combatants often try to return to their prewar
communities and resume their prewar lives, only to encounter a range of challenges, from
finding gainful employment in an often dramatically altered social and political landscape to
negotiating newly acquired physical and mental illnesses. Returning combatants may face
particular challenges accepting certain necessities of the conflict that have caused changes
within their communities, such as the prevalence of women in the public sphere following
men’s movements to the front lines, or community stigmatization of those who fought for
the enemy or perpetrated atrocities against civilians. As such, former combatants can be
rendered vulnerable to future violent outbreaks in their communities, from domestic
violence within families to more public criminal acts such as theft and murder. Such
experiences can leave them incapable of envisioning a future for themselves that includes
cooperation across the national, ethnic, racial, religious, or gender boundaries that enabled or
resulted from the conflict in which they were embedded. Such phenomena have been
documented among men and women combatants alike, as part of the broader literature on
disarmament, demobilization, and reintegration of child soldiers, among other types of
combatants, in such postwar settings as Sierra Leone and northern Uganda, for example
(MacKenzie 2009; McKay 2004).
Broadly speaking, women’s experiences of war can vary in important ways, although the
overall outcome in terms of their ability to envision a peaceful, collaborative future among
parties to the conflict may be very similar. In many contexts around the world, women are
not seen as appropriate combatants, although there have been important exceptions to this
statement in such places as northern Uganda, Sierra Leone, Kashmir, and Syria (Cohen
2013; Du¨zgu¨n 2016; Parashar 2011, 2009; Shekhawat 2015). More commonly, women are
called on to serve military and paramilitary institutions in other ways, by cooking, cleaning,
and providing moral support for troops and by rearing future generations of soldiers, for
example. Because they rarely serve on the front lines of conflict, however, women more
commonly experience the conflict directly only when it arrives in their communities,
resulting in forced displacement or service to the newly arrived enemy combatants. In this
context, women are frequently vulnerable to sexual violence, such as rape, forced marriage,
and forced maternity, and may also witness the torture and murder of members of their
community, including children and elders who are incapable of defending themselves and
can serve no function for the combatants.
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As the conflict then draws to a close, women too must find ways to reintegrate into
their communities while navigating a range of physical and mental illnesses associated with
their firsthand experiences of the conflict, but perhaps further complicated by the suspicion
or knowledge that they have been sexually assaulted or, worse yet, the perception that they
willingly engaged in sexual acts with enemy combatants. Indeed, sexual violence, or
gender-based violence, as it is commonly referred to in the literature (see, e.g., Heise,
Ellsberg, and Gottmoeller 2002; Russo and Pirlott 2006), is a key point of focus for many
reconciliation initiatives across the world. This at times singular focus emerges from the
realization that women in post-conflict settings often struggle with community stigmati-
zation and rejection associated with having suffered sexual violence in war and related mass
atrocities, further complicated by the frequent need for women to transgress gender norms
to take on roles and responsibilities previously performed by male family members who did
not return from the war.
To return to the Bosnian example, following the genocide of Bosniak men at Srebrenica
and throughout the Republika Srpska more generally, the Bosniak women who survived
found themselves face-to-face with the unenviable task of rebuilding their communities
through direct engagement in the previously male-dominated public sphere—a pattern that
has repeated itself in other contexts, such as postwar Peru, Colombia, and northern Uganda
(Amony 2015; Theidon 2007). These Bosnian women demonstrated remarkable resilience:
despite often ongoing struggles with significant psychological and physical illnesses, they
nonetheless found ways to speak publicly about their experiences, rejecting the stigma that
they might have otherwise been forced to endure as ‘‘raped women’’ and taking on leadership
roles in the rebuilding of their communities (Helms 2010; Leydesdorff 2011; Vranic´ 1996).
That said, studies by scholars such as political scientist R. Charli Carpenter (2006) and
international law expert Chris Dolan (2014) suggest that men who survived rape and other
forms of gender-based violence frequently continue to endure social stigmatization, even in
settings where women have been empowered to break the silence on the subject. For this
reason, these scholars emphasize the importance of recognizing and challenging the silences
around gender-based violence—including not only rape and other forms of sexual violence
but also forced recruitment and sex-selective massacre—endured by civilian men and boys in
a range of settings around the world.
The stigma associated with gender-based and sexual violence may be further heightened
in the case of individuals who are or are perceived to be lesbian, gay, bisexual, transgender, or
intersex (LGBTI), for example. People who do not clearly adhere to the gender norms or
sexual identities that dominate their communities are often vulnerable, during war and
related mass atrocities, to additional forms of exploitation, discrimination, and sexual
violence, which are often an extension of the microaggressions and oppression they would
endure during times of peace. They may be excluded from serving in the military or
paramilitary organizations, and subsequently as noncombatants they may be extremely
vulnerable to various forms of torture, rape, and execution that are intended to highlight
and punish or ‘‘correct’’ their perceived transgressions against dominant gender norms. For
example, amid general calls for South Africa to prevent violence against women (Gobodo-
Madikizela, Fish, and Shefer 2014), various human rights groups have placed special
emphasis on recognizing the prevalence of ‘‘corrective rape’’ as a means of punishing black
South African lesbians in the postapartheid period (see, e.g., Human Rights Watch 2007;
Martin et al. 2009; Morrissey 2013). In this post-conflict context—in which homosexuality
is often rejected as an alleged remnant of the nation’s colonial past—women’s efforts to
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report these assaults and demand some form of legal accountability are most commonly met
with indifference among law enforcement, creating insurmountable barriers to justice and
reconciliation. This renders the women vulnerable to further persecution both as lesbians and
as people who have broken ‘‘the traditional South African discourse of silence surrounding
non-normative sexuality’’ (Morrissey 2013, 84).
FEMINIST INTERVENTIONS IN RECONCILIATION
These generalized experiences of war and related mass atrocities have been complicated in
important ways, however, by feminist interventions in studies of reconciliation. For example,
in response to Jones’s efforts to distinguish the plight of men as not only the primary
combatants but also the primary victims of war and genocide in terms of numbers of dead,
from women as the primary victims of sexual violence, Carpenter (2002) called for an explicit
differentiation between sex and gender and a more comprehensive understanding of gender-
selective violence, rather than sex-selective massacres. This allowed her to explore gender—
understood in this instance as ‘‘a social process whereby divisions of labour, power, and
emotion, as well as modes of dress and identity, are differentiated (and the differences
naturalized), among as well as between men and women’’ in ways that do not necessarily
correspond with biological sex—as but one of several interrelated social factors, such as race,
class, age, and status, that affect a person’s experience of war and related mass atrocities and
the peace-building initiatives that follow given the gender norms operating in a particular
setting (Carpenter 2002, 80).
Feminist scholars have further pushed beyond the overly simplistic focus on men as
combatants and women as victims of sexual violence to highlight women’s agency in conflicts
as combatants, political leaders, and activists, for example, who take up arms and otherwise
act alongside men on behalf of their communities, families, or political interests (see, e.g.,
Cohen 2013; Gentry and Sjoberg 2015; Hogg 2010; Jessee 2015; Parashar 2011, 2009;
Sharlach 1999). Of particular importance, political scientists Caron E. Gentry and Laura
Sjoberg (2015) have prompted scholars and practitioners to push beyond patriarchal narra-
tives that limit characterizations of women’s roles during conflict to that of mother, monster,
whore, or some combination of these, because of the narrowly defined gender norms that
persist in discourses on global politics, including post-conflict reconciliation. They stress that
little insight can be gained in approaching women’s participation in violence and its after-
maths as exceptional or in stereotyping women’s involvement in conflicts and that, more
importantly, such tendencies result in theoretical inaccuracies. As such, they call for the
‘‘active disruption’’ of such stereotypes to better explore the feminine elements inherent in
political violence and its aftermaths (Gentry and Sjoberg 2015, 157).
Along a similar line, other scholars have sought to destabilize narratives that stereotype
men solely as combatants and perpetrators to examine a wider range of men’s experiences of
war and its aftermaths. For example, Dolan (2002) has highlighted the importance of
understanding the impact of ‘‘collapsing masculinities’’ on sexual violence against men and
boys in contexts such as the 20-year civil war in northern Uganda. He argues as follows:
Gendered assumptions, which for centuries obscured the rape of women and girls,
continue to operate to mask what is happening to men and boys. . . . When a ‘‘real
man’’ is defined as strong and in control and invulnerable, it is easy to assume that if
he was engaged in a same-sex act, then surely ‘‘he must have wanted it.’’ (Dolan
2014, 2; emphasis in the original)
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Conversely, Dolan finds that the gap between the rates of sexual assault endured by women
and menmay not be as substantial as previously believed and that the impact of these assaults
on men can include low self-esteem, depression, sexual dysfunction, and the destabilization
of gender and sexual identity, in addition to social marginalization and isolation. Nonethe-
less, many of the humanitarian initiatives that emerge in the aftermath of conflict do little to
address the specific harms and lingering vulnerabilities endured by men and boys who have
survived sexual assaults. Indeed, following interviews with ten actors working toward shaping
international policy regarding the recognition of male victims of conflict-related sexual
violence, human rights lawyer Ellen Anna Philo Gorris (2015, 412) concluded that ‘‘men
and boys have been historically and structurally rendered an invisible group of victims in
international human rights and policy responses towards conflict-related sexual violence
stemming from the United Nations.’’
Thus, given the often varied experiences of men and women surrounding war and
related mass atrocities, a common theme among the feminist scholars and practitioners
discussed in this section is that reconciliation initiatives must be carefully targeted to address
more effectively and comprehensively the specific post-conflict needs of men and women
alike, as well as members of the local LGBTI community and related special interest groups
who find themselves uniquely vulnerable in conflicts and their aftermaths. This approach,
while necessary in many post-conflict settings, can add further complicating factors to the
already ‘‘shaky balance’’ that must be sought in bringing universal norms on reconciliation
promoted by the United Nations into conversation with the particular circumstances of
individual conflicts (Wagner 2010, 25).
RECONCILIATION IN THE AFTERMATH OF THE 1994
RWANDAN GENOCIDE
To this end, present-day Rwanda effectively demonstrates many of the benefits and chal-
lenges that exist in applying a gendered lens to reconciliation in the aftermath of civil war and
genocide. Following years of relative stability, in 1990 the Rwandan Patriotic Front (RPF)—
a Uganda-based political party composed primarily of Tutsi who had fled political violence
that targeted Tutsi monarchists in the era surrounding Rwandan independence in 1962—
invaded Rwanda. This resulted in a three-year civil war that polarized the civilian population
along political and ethnic lines. Juve´nal Habyarimana, a Hutu politician who had ruled the
country as president since 1973 and whose political legitimacy derived almost entirely from
the powerful family of his wife, Agathe Kanziga, was ill prepared to effectively resist the RPF
invasion and, as a result, was gradually forced to accept assistance from the United Nations in
negotiating a power-sharing agreement. At the same time, however, elites within the
Habyarimana regime became increasingly radicalized, leading to the emergence of an
extremist Hutu Power movement among Habyarimana’s inner circle, including Kanziga
and her brothers. These extremists began disseminating propaganda through the Rwandan
media—most notably via the infamous magazine Kangura (meaning ‘‘to wake others’’),
which was established at the start of the civil war, and Radio Te´le´vision Libre des Mille
Collines (RTLM), established in 1993. These media outlets encouraged civilians to view the
RPF and Rwanda’s minority Tutsi population more generally as a threat by promoting a
politicized version of Rwandan history in which the Hutu majority had allegedly been
enslaved and oppressed by the predominantly Tutsi monarchy prior to independence.
Simultaneously, the Hutu Power movement created youth militias—the Interahamwe
(meaning ‘‘those who fight together’’ or ‘‘those who work together’’) and the Impuzamugambi
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(meaning ‘‘those who have a common goal’’)—which in their earliest incarnations trained
Hutu youth to defend their communities against the RPF. However, the purpose of these
militias gradually expanded to include priming their members to perpetrate atrocities against
Tutsi civilians and other alleged ibyitso (RPF supporters).
Recognizing the growing potential for mass atrocities, the international community
tried to intervene by empowering the United Nations Assistance Mission for Rwanda to
oversee the creation of a broad-based transitional government that included representation
by Habyarimana’s National Republican Movement for Democracy and Development and
the RPF, among other emergent political parties. On April 6, 1994, however, before the
transitional government was implemented, unknown parties shot down Habyarimana’s
plane on its approach to Kayibanda International Airport. In the hours following the
confirmation of Habyarimana’s assassination, RTLM broadcast allegations that the RPF
was responsible and called on Hutu to avenge the death of their president. Simultaneously,
the Presidential Guard began murdering the nation’s political opposition and organizing the
Interahamwe and Impuzamugambi to establish roadblocks throughout the capital, Kigali, at
which fleeing Tutsi civilians were murdered. Over the next three months, Hutu Power
extremists facilitated massacres of Tutsi civilians in all regions of the country not yet under
RPF control. An estimated 180,000 civilians ultimately chose to participate in the genocide,
killing Tutsi at churches and other sites where they sought refuge, at roadblocks as they
attempted to flee, and in the swamps and forests where they hid (Straus 2004). By the time
the RPF declared its military victory on July 18, 1994, an estimated 500,000 to 800,000
Rwandans had been brutally murdered, most of whom were Tutsi (Des Forges 1999). In
addition, the Hutu Power extremists had used rape as a weapon of war—against Tutsi
women primarily as punishment for their perceived superior beauty, among other factors,
but also against Hutu and Twa women who had married or had children with Tutsi men—
resulting in an estimated 250,000 to 500,000 victims of sexual assault (Baines 2003; Degni-
Se´gui 1996; Nowrojee 1996; Taylor 1999). These assaults resulted in an estimated 2,000 to
5,000 children born of rape, many of whom were subsequently stigmatized by their
communities as ‘‘little Interahamwe’’ (Mukangendo 2007, 42).
In the aftermath of the genocide, the RPF and the international community have
worked, often in tandem, to promote reconciliation across ethnic and political divides. To
this end, the RPF boasts a solid track record of attracting international donors, accounting
for approximately 40 percent of Rwanda’s annual budget (Swedlund 2013). Much of this
funding is, quite appropriately, channeled into a range of policies aimed at improving the
overall lives of the Rwandan people in a manner that adheres closely to the United Nations’
aforementioned best practices toward promoting reconciliation. Under the banner of its
ambitious Vision 2020 platform, the RPF in 2000 initiated broad educational reforms aimed
at ensuring literacy and a basic level of education, with the long-term goal of reducing
poverty; healthcare initiatives aimed at reducing the transmission of HIV/AIDS; a series of
ambitious family-planning policies aimed at reducing population growth; and a gender
equality policy that has led to a much-lauded women’s majority among Rwanda’s parlia-
mentarians (Republic of Rwanda 2012).
However, while guided by the United Nations in many of its reconciliation initiatives,
the Rwandan government has often merged these with distinctly Rwandan practices in an
effort to improve its ability to promote genuine social repair in Rwanda, while simulta-
neously providing the government with an opportunity to shape these initiatives according to
its political agenda. The National Unity and Reconciliation Commission (NURC) is a
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perfect example of this, charged with managing programs aimed at promoting reconciliation
throughout Rwandan society and facilitating long-term regional stability.
Among its many initiatives, NURC has adapted the precolonial practices of ingando and
itorero to educate Rwandans about their responsibilities in the ‘‘New Rwanda’’ and the
dangers of bad governance and ethnic divisionism. Precolonial kings used ingando during
periods of upheaval as a communal retreat ‘‘where people shared in decisions on war and
peace and how Rwanda was governed’’ (Nantulya 2006, 48). Following the genocide,
ingando referred to either solidarity camps where politicians, civil society leaders, and
university students undergo ‘‘a form of political indoctrination for those who occupy, or
will occupy, leadership positions’’ or mandatory reeducation camps for ge´nocidaires and
other criminals who are preparing to return to their communities (Thomson 2011, 334; see
also Mgbako 2005). Conversely, in the precolonial period itorero included a range of court
institutions wherein Rwandans studied Kinyarwanda (the nation’s indigenous language) and
sports, dance, music, and national values. In 2009, however, itorero was reinvented by the
RPF as leadership development centers attended by Rwandan civilians to support commun-
ity public works projects (Sundberg 2016). These centers teach Rwandans to eschew ethnic
labels and identify—first and foremost—as Rwandans working together for the ‘‘New
Rwanda.’’ Indeed, public discussion of ethnicity has become taboo in present-day
Rwanda—reinforced through a strict law that prohibits ‘‘genocide ideology’’—although
ethnic labels continue to be used in many private settings.
However, there is discussion among scholars and practitioners regarding the extent to
which ingando and itorero are promoting reconciliation or whether they are primarily
serving to reinforce the RPF’s political legitimacy. Numerous human rights organizations
and scholars have documented a growing atmosphere of fear among Rwandans civilians,
many of whom express anxiety regarding the consequences of publicly contradicting or
criticizing the RPF and its policies. For example, in a 2010 Amnesty International press
release, Erwin van der Borght, the director of the organization’s Africa Programme, stated
that ‘‘Rwandans live in fear of being punished for saying the wrong thing. Most take the safe
option of staying silent.’’ Jennie E. Burnet has similarly criticized the RPF’s program of
nationalized commemoration for creating a ‘‘shibboleth of genocide’’ (the term shibboleth
meaning an outmoded but nonetheless defining framework) that permits people to speak
publicly about their experiences of the genocide only in terms that uphold the dichotomous
official narrative in which Tutsi are victims andHutu are perpetrators (2012, 128). Similarly,
political scientist Susan Thomson has documented the everyday practices of ‘‘staying on the
sidelines, irreverent compliance, and withdrawn muteness’’ through which Rwandan civil-
ians demonstrate resistance to the RPF’s policies of national unity and reconciliation,
recognizing the inadequacies of these policies to resolve the problems they face in the
postgenocide period (2013, 9).
The Rwandan government has similarly incorporated locally conceived transitional
justice mechanisms into its efforts to ensure ‘‘universal accountability’’ for the genocide
(Gahima 2013, xxxviii). Disapproving of the decision by the International Criminal Tribu-
nal for Rwanda to prosecute high-level ge´nocidaires outside Rwanda, the RPF in 1996 tasked
Rwanda’s newly reconstructed national courts with prosecuting the remaining 150,000
alleged ge´nocidaires who had been imprisoned and were awaiting trial (Tertsakian 2008).
It quickly became evident, however, that it would be impossible to try this many accused in a
timely manner in the national courts. Thus, the RPF reinvented gacaca (meaning ‘‘justice on
the grass’’)—a precolonial dispute resolution mechanism—to address the overflow by trying
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the cases of low-level ge´nocidaires in open-air courts within their communities (Ingelaere
2009; Thomson and Nagy 2011; Waldorf 2006). Over a decade, more than 1.9 million
genocide-related cases were tried through gacaca, with varying degrees of success (Rutayisire
and Richters 2014).
Once again, however, gacaca is surrounded by debate regarding the extent to which it
effectively promotes reconciliation among Rwandans. Political scientist Phil Clark argues
that gacaca is allowing Rwandans to achieve what he terms ‘‘negotiated reconciliation’’
through long-term formal and informal negotiations between antagonistic parties (2014,
304). Other experts on gacaca, however, have documented its shortcomings, from the often
oppressive measures used by district-level authorities to ensure a quorum (Thomson and
Nagy 2011) and the potential for interpersonal conflicts to prompt false accusations that
result in wrongful sentences (Rettig 2011), to the institution’s tendency to privilege the
RPF’s official narrative over people’s lived experiences of the genocide (Ingelaere 2009).
Within these reconciliation programs, the Rwandan government has made a sustained
effort to put its gender equality reforms into practice, recognizing that pregenocide Rwandan
gender norms—alongside ethnic and political affiliation, among other social identifiers—
had a significant impact on the patterns of violence during the genocide. In the decades
immediately preceding the genocide, Rwandan society was patriarchal; moreover, ethnicity
A Rwandan woman appears before gacaca to face criminal charges related to the 1994 genocide,
October 16, 2001. The gacaca courts were a precolonial form of dispute resolution that was adapted by
the Rwandan government to address the massive backlog of alleged ge´nocidaires awaiting trial. Between
their nation-wide adoption in 2005 and official closure in 2012, an estimated 11,000 courts considered
nearly two million allegations of genocide-related crimes. MARCO LONGARI / AFP / GETTY IMAGES.
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was inherited patrilineally, and only men could formally inherit wealth and properties from
their fathers. The ideal for Rwandan women was to be reserved, submissive, respectful, silent,
and maternal, focusing their energies on maintaining a respectable household and raising
polite children (Burnet 2012). Rwandan women were largely excluded from politics,
commerce, law, and education compared to their male compatriots (Burnet 2012, 2010;
Jefremovas 1991; Nowrojee 1996; Sharlach 1999). Women who did not conform or actively
resisted such expectations could be publicly mocked and ostracized for transgressing Rwan-
dan gender norms. For example, in 1991 anthropologist Villia Jefremovas observed that ‘‘the
language of public morality and stereotype is one weapon . . . used by both men and women
to interpret, manipulate, validate or negate control over labour, resources and surplus’’
produced by women (379).
While the Hutu Power extremists targeted Tutsi men and women alike, Tutsi women
more so than men were targeted with sexual violence, while Tutsi men were more frequently
murdered. There are notable exceptions to this statement, as groups such as Human Rights
Watch and Ibuka have documented instances in which Tutsi men were subject to sexual
violence, including rape, castration, and forced incest. However, while there is public space in
Rwanda in which Tutsi women can discuss their experiences of sexual violence during the
genocide, there exists a powerful taboo that prohibits Rwandan men from speaking as freely
about their experiences of sexual violence during the genocide, for the reasons cited above by
Dolan and Gorris.
The genocide ultimately undermined the social vitality of many Tutsi communities and
families, while also leaving a large number of women-headed households that faced sub-
stantial challenges in overcoming economic deprivation, as well as the mental and physical
health challenges that accompanied firsthand experiences of the genocide’s extreme violence.
The disproportionate number of women survivors has meant that they have often born the
weight of the nation’s various reconciliation programs, both in terms of the ‘‘narrative
burden’’ associated with testifying at commemorative ceremonies, trials, political rallies,
and related public events—occasions at which it is often important to narrate one’s experi-
ences in a manner that upholds the RPF’s official narrative surrounding the genocide ( Jessee
2017; Theidon 2007). As in many post-conflict settings, this often results in women
survivors being given opportunities to speak publicly about certain kinds of experiences,
such as rape and other forms of sexual violence that uphold the brutality of the violence
perpetrated by the Hutu Power extremists, but silencing them on other matters that might
complicate the RPF’s official narrative or allow for a more varied accounting of women’s
experiences of the genocide (e.g., Ross 2003).
Likewise, the prevalence of women-headed households means that female genocide
survivors have often had to take the lead in negotiating the future economic and social
survival of their families and communities amid an often tense, and increasingly author-
itarian, political climate in which failure can be synonymous with resistance to RPF policies
(Burnet 2012; Longman 2011; Theidon 2007). On a more positive note, this has provided
some substantial opportunities for a handful of Rwandan women to take active leadership
roles in shaping policies and civil society in the postgenocide period. Most notably, these
women have been able to pursue a gender equality agenda that has made meaningful progress
in several instances toward shaping and implementing international gender equality policies
in Rwanda (Mageza-Barthel 2015).
There is, however, extensive debate regarding the extent to which current gender
equality and reconciliation initiatives are improving the everyday lives of ordinary Rwandan
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women, including rural genocide survivors. On the one hand, the Rwandan government and
its supporters are keen to promote the exceptional strides it has made in empowering
Rwandan women to take up positions in the government and civil society through a
committed policy of gender mainstreaming overseen by the Ministry of Gender and Family
Promotion, the Gender Monitoring Office, the National Women’s Council, and the
Rwanda Women Parliamentary Forum (Republic of Rwanda 2010). On the other hand,
there are multiple critics of this success, particularly emerging from scholars who have
worked extensively with rural Rwandan women, who argue that Rwanda’s gender equality
policies have genuinely benefited only female political elites. For example, Burnet has argued
that despite gender mainstreaming and increased political representation by women, rural
women often find it difficult to assert themselves independently from their husbands, fathers,
or brothers or to take on roles that are perceived to be the sole domain of men. Burnet (2012,
45) has documented modern usage of the phrase ni igishegabo—translated as ‘‘she’s a big
man-woman’’—to insult women who are outspoken and aggressive, despite these traits being
prized when displayed by Rwandan men. Similarly, sociologist Marie Berry’s (2014) work
among Rwandan women who comprised the nation’s informal or agricultural sectors found
that the benefits of gender equality policies were not being realized except among a small
minority of women political elites. This trend emerges in large part from the cost-prohibitive
nature of education and rents and permits for small businesses, as well as the various forms of
structural violence to which many rural Rwandan women are vulnerable precisely because
their lack of success contradicts the positive image of the New Rwanda the RPF is determined
to uphold. Thomson, meanwhile, has argued that while Rwandan women’s visibility in
public life is at an all-time high, their ability to shape their nation’s future is limited by the
fact that Paul Kagame, who began serving as Rwandan president in 2000, and his advisers
dominate parliament, making it difficult for women parliamentarians to implement mean-
ingful changes. She concludes that ‘‘the number of Rwandan female parliamentarians glosses
over their limited role in policymaking, the continued marginalization of the vast majority of
Rwandan women, and the government’s superficial commitment to democratic governance’’
(Thomson 2015, 20–21). In sum, it seems that Rwandan women political elites are better
positioned to take advantage of the RPF’s gender equality reforms than their rural counter-
parts and even then perhaps only in arenas in which they have the formal approval of the RPF
and that do not involve any transgression of Rwandan gender norms.
In terms of the ge´nocidaires, there were only an estimated 2,000 Hutu women who
directly participated in the genocide. Among these female ge´nocidaires, there is a tendency for
them to present themselves as victims of gender-based discrimination—particularly among
rural women ge´nocidaires—and, to a lesser extent in the case of elites, as victims of the
particular brand of victor’s justice meted out by the RPF (Jessee 2015). There may be an
element of truth to these claims to victimization. In terms of sentencing, Nicole Hogg (2010,
81), a specialist in international humanitarian law, found that women ge´nocidaires who
participated indirectly in the genocide frequently received preferential treatment resulting
from the ‘‘chivalry’’ of men, whereby ‘‘male witnesses, investigators, prosecutors and judges
are so infected by gender stereotypes that they either cannot perceive of women as criminals or
feel protective towards them in spite of their suspected or proven criminality.’’ However, when
direct criminal responsibility for murder, mutilation, or other serious crimes was established,
women ge´nocidaires were ‘‘regarded as ‘evil’ or ‘non-women’ and treated with the full force of
the law’’ (71). This tendency emerged from the women’s transgression of contemporary
Rwandan gender norms when they opted to engage in direct physical violence, against which
there were strong taboos in Rwandan society prior to the genocide (Jessee 2015).
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Nonetheless, it is primarily Hutu men who bear the burden of criminal responsibility for
the genocide as the primary masterminds and perpetrators of the violence. Much as with
women ge´nocidaires, however, many male ge´nocidaires expressed a strong sense of victim-
ization resulting from the political climate in Rwanda surrounding the genocide, among
other factors. In terms of their criminal actions, they cited diverse and complex motives: most
notably, fear resulting from firsthand experiences of violence perpetrated by the RPF against
Hutu civilians during the three-year civil war; situational peer pressure from Hutu Power
extremists in their communities that made it difficult for them to resist the violence; and
inherited memories of abuse at the hands of Tutsi elites affiliated with Rwanda’s monarchy
prior to the nation’s independence in 1962 (Fujii 2008; Jessee 2017; Mironko 2004; Straus
2004; OHCHR 2010). Given that Rwanda’s postgenocide transitional justice and reconci-
liation programs are controlled by the predominantly Tutsi RPF, the alleged mischaracteri-
zation of their criminal complicity was then compounded by their postgenocide experiences
of Rwanda’s legal system. These experiences were allegedly characterized by arbitrary arrests
and detentions marked by the use of torture to extract confessions; poor prison conditions;
long periods of detention while awaiting trial during which accused ge´nocidaires were given
no legal representation to prepare their cases; and the sense that survivors’ testimonies were
privileged over that of ge´nocidaires and their supporters, resulting in sentences dispropor-
tionate to the actual crimes committed. Socially, ge´nocidaires further complained that the
stigma associated with being labeled a ge´nocidaire resulted in widespread rejection by family
and friends to avoid political contamination. In addition, the daily conditions in the prisons
were so poor that ge´nocidaires often went hungry and without appropriate medical care.
Further compounding the problems they navigated in their everyday lives, many ge´nocid-
aires reported symptoms consistent with trauma and post-traumatic stress disorder related to
the violence they had enacted on behalf of and endured at the hands of the RPF, but they
claimed they were given no treatment nor were their losses and suffering formally acknowl-
edged by the government ( Jessee 2017). Such experiences rendered ge´nocidaires largely
incapable of imagining a peaceful future for themselves that included collaboration across
ethnic and political lines, despite substantial efforts on the part of the Rwandan government
to promote reconciliation.
Summary
In examining in tandem the postgenocide experiences of Rwandan survivors and perpetra-
tors, among other parties to Rwanda’s civil war and genocide, it becomes clear that
reconciliation is a complicated and fraught process, particularly when viewed through the
lens of the nation’s shifting gender norms. Despite significant efforts on the part of the RPF
to promote reconciliation in accordance with international standards, a formidable and
unenviable task under the best circumstances, its need to demonstrate legitimacy—as a
predominantly Tutsi political party exercising power over a majority Hutu civilian popula-
tion, not to mention a citizenry that has been deeply divided by experiences of civil war and
genocide in ways that go far beyond ethnicity—has resulted in many of these initiatives
becoming bogged down in local politics.
With respect to these difficulties, scholars have increasingly documented various subtle
forms of civilian resistance to state-led reconciliation initiatives, among survivors, bystanders,
and perpetrators of the genocide, and men and women alike, as well as lingering political
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frustrations that have prompted many experts to conclude that there remains a powerful
reservoir of ethnic and political tensions that threatens the long-term political stability of the
nation ( Jessee 2017; see also Buckley-Zistel 2006; Straus and Waldorf 2011; Thomson
2013). While the civil war and genocide affected Rwandan men and women in different
ways, the outcomes in terms of their acceptance of the available avenues for reconciliation
seem to be fairly consistent regardless of gender. Rwanda is by nomeans exceptional in facing
these challenges. Indeed, as noted above, promoting genuine reconciliation is an inherently
violent process. Nonetheless, the Rwandan case study raises provocative questions about the
potential for state-led reconciliation initiatives, even when crafted in accordance with
international best practices, to affect meaningful social repair among communities. These
questions appear particularly salient in instances in which reconciliation initiatives are
introduced by an authoritarian regime alongside a largely one-sided approach to transitional
justice that fails to account for either the full range of atrocities endured by the population or
the specific needs of the post-conflict citizenry given their often gendered experiences of the
conflict.
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